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Kindred spirits: Fanon’s postcolonialism
This essay concerns the significance of phenomenology in Frantz Fanon’s
thought and its influence on the autobiographic and ethnographic con-
tours of his study, Black Skin, White Masks. Of note is Fanon’s movement
between metaphor and phenomenology, especially as concerns figures of
the hand and the body, and how his narratological treatment of these
figures, both with respect to himself and the Antillean, reveals to us a
new understanding of the place of language, time and action in Fanon’s
thought and contemporary literature and postcolonial race theory and
criticism.
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‘O my body, make of me always a man who questions!’1 And with his ‘final
prayer’ Frantz Fanon concludes the last page of his Black Skin, White Masks
(1952) (B, p. 232). Yet if this is our coda, our journey begins, chiastically,
in its introductory pages, where, Fanon cryptically writes, ‘[t]he black is not
a man’ (p. 8). Fanon will later find more correct, if not true, its antithesis,
which is that ‘[t]he black is a black man’ (p. 8). Fanon explains this trou-
bling semiology ‘as the result of a series of aberrations of affect’, one con-
sequence of which is the presumed distinction between ‘[w]hat . . . a man
want[s]’, and ‘[w]hat’ a ‘black man want[s]’ (p. 8). Because of these aberra-
tions, Fanon explains, the black man finds himself ‘rooted at the core of a
universe’, and it is from this universe ‘which he must be extricated’ (p. 8).
‘The problem’, Fanon insists, ‘is important’ (p. 8). Yet if this is our
‘problem’, ‘[h]ow’, Fanon asks, ‘do we extricate ourselves?’ (p. 10).
Fanon’s explanation arrives a few pages later, with his ‘beli[ef] that only
a psychoanalytical interpretation of the black problem can lay bare the
anomalies of affect that are responsible for the structure of this complex’
(p. 10). Fanon’s emphasis on hands and excavation, as a type of exegetical
autopsy in their own right, is notable, if not entirely surprising, Fanon’s
writing, on the penultimate page of Black Skin, White Masks, ‘[t]hat the
tool’ should ‘never possess the man’ (p. 231).2 ‘Man’, according to
Fanon, ‘is what brings society into being’, thus is ‘the prognosis in the
hands of those who are willing to get rid of the worm-eaten roots of the
structure’ (p. 11). And with this sentence Fanon finds himself alongside
Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Friedrich Nietzsche and at odds with Jean-
Paul Sartre and Jacques Lacan.
Published in 1948, four years before Fanon’s Black Skin, White
Masks, Sartre’s tempestuous ‘Orphée Noir’ (Black Orpheus) is arguably
the clearest introduction to the two ‘problem[s]’ which would ‘face’
both Fanon and ‘the Negro of the Antilles’, which are the ‘problem[s]’
of ‘time’ and ‘[a]ction’.3 Indeed, though Fanon closes his Introduction
with the claim that ‘[s]ince [he] was born in the Antilles, [his] obser-
vations and [his] conclusions are valid only for the Antilles – at least con-
cerning the black man at home’, he redacts this narrow province four
pages later, ‘broaden[ing] the field of this description’ to ‘include’, via
‘the Antille[an]’, ‘every colonized man’ (pp. 14, 18; emphasis in original).
Still, we lose sight of these two problems if we fail to acknowledge the
overarching third one through which Fanon expresses them: ‘language’
(p. 18). ‘I ascribe a basic importance to the phenomenon of language’,
Fanon writes, and ‘[t]hat is why I find it necessary to begin with this
subject’ (p. 17). ‘To speak’, Fanon observes, ‘means to be in a position
to use a certain syntax, to grasp the morphology of this or that culture’
(p. 17). ‘[B]ut it means above all’, Fanon emphasizes, ‘to assume a





























getting at’, Fanon continues, ‘becomes plain’: ‘[a] man who has a
language consequently possesses the world expressed and implied by
that language’ (p. 18). If Fanon wears his phenomenology on his
sleeve, it is because what is critical to Fanon, both ‘in this chapter’ and
in the entirety of Black Skin, White Masks, is this ‘retaining-wall relation
between language and group’, which for Fanon takes as its ‘historical’
basis the ‘underst[anding]’ that, as Jacques Derrida explains, ‘[t]here is
no social institution before language’.4
Language, according to Derrida, ‘is not one cultural element among
others’.5 On the contrary, ‘it is the element of institutions in general,
[and] includes and constructs the entire social structure’ (O, p. 219).
Derrida is instructive. The Antillean ‘wants to speak French’, Fanon
writes, and this because he believes that in speaking that language so will
he, in turn, ‘comprehen[d] the dimension of the other’ (B, p. 17; emphasis
in original). The Antillean’s phenomenological understanding of language
and culture turns upon Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ‘distin[ction] between
language and speech’ (O, p. 230). Although ‘[s]peech belongs to man’,
Derrida writes, and hence ‘is universally human’, ‘languages are diverse’
(p. 230). It is this distinction Rousseau has in mind when he observes, in
his 1852 manuscript, Essay on the Origin of Languages, that ‘[l]anguage dis-
tinguishes nations from each other’ (qtd. in O, p. 230). ‘[O]ne does not
know where a man comes from’, Rousseau writes, ‘until he has spoken’
(ibid.). Rousseau’s is the insistence that language’s relation to culture is pro-
prietary: ‘each learns the language of his own country’ ‘[o]ut of usage and
necessity’ (ibid.).6 It is Rousseau Fanon refers us to in his account of the
Antillean’s assumption that by mastering that French language, hence by
mastering the French culture, so will he find himself in possession of that
‘key’ by which he may ‘open doors which were still barred to him fifty
years ago’ (B, pp. 18, 38).
Not that the Antillean would easily find the key. Though beginning in
Fanon’s introductory pages, the key’s troubled story reaches its denoue-
ment in his closing ones, where we find Fanon reading a few passages
from Spanish playwright Andre de Clarmunte’s El valiante negro de
Flandres, itself within a larger book read by Fanon, Oliver Brachfeld’s Infer-
iority Feelings in the Individual and the Group (1936) (p. 213). In the
former we are introduced to Juan de Mérida, whose soliloquy, beyond ven-
triloquizing the Antillean’s existential angst in the face of those myriad
closed doors, so cleanly cuts into Fanon’s own narrative as to cleave an
opening wide enough for the enveloping of all three stories: Fanon’s, the
Antillean’s and de Mérida’s. ‘What do souls matter?’ de Mérida innocently
asks, only to find himself, two lines down, in ‘despair’, the realization,
though spaced between just two lines, weighted with the significance of
many more (pp. 214, 215). He was wrong all along. Not that the soul is




























not inviolable, but that the soul does not matter. ‘What is it, really, . . . to
be black’, de Mérida discovers, can indeed be reduced to ‘being that color’
(p. 214). The ‘anguish’ was palpable (p. 215). ‘For that outrage’, de Mérida
‘will denounce/fate, [his] times, heaven, and all those who made [him]
black!’ (p. 214). Yet the ‘taint’, as Fanon puts it, would remain untouched,
and this regardless of how often de Mérida apostrophized to ‘heaven’: ‘O
. . . what a dread thing’ (pp. 213, 215). For this ‘thing’, which de Mérida
calls a ‘curse’, is a curse not of fate, nor heaven, but of ‘color’ (p. 214). And
it is why, Fanon observes, his soul ‘cannot save him’ (p. 214). What ‘saps,
invalidates, all his actions’, Fanon writes of de Mérida, hence what
‘burden[s]’ his body with ‘shame’, prompting de Mérida to ask, in his soli-
loquy, ‘Are black men not/men?’ is indeed not his soul, though something
equally inviolable, something which he ‘cannot change’, nor from which he
may ‘flee’ – it is his ‘being black’.7 Like the colonized figure in the hands of
Sartre and M. Mannoni, de Mérida similarly finds himself with ‘only one
solution . . . : “furnish proofs” of his whiteness to others and above all to
himself’ (p. 215). de Mérida, along with the Antillean, had found the
key, which, though figured through the ‘appearence’ of the ‘individual’,
‘lies not in the . . . individual but rather in that of the environment’
(pp. 214, 213; emphasis in original). If the Antillean cannot pass
through those doors as an Antillean, he will pass as a European. Not
that the Antillean is unaware of the difficulties. ‘[I]t is no use painting
the foot of the tree white’, Fanon had learned from Aimé Césaire, while
‘the strength of the bark cries out from beneath the paint . . . ’ (p. 198).
Fanon broadens the scope of his analysis to include the Antillean’s
experience as an index to all colonized people. He does this because be
believes that by ‘study[ing] the language of the Antille[an]’ so will he dis-
cover, via that language, ‘some characteristics of his world’ (p. 38). What
Fanon discovers is a ‘quest for subtleties, for refinements of language’, all
of which constitutive of ‘so many further means of proving to himself
that he has measured up to the culture’ (pp. 38–39). Thus Fanon’s
example of the Antillean ‘lock[ed] . . . into his room and read[ing] aloud
for hours’ (p. 21). For the Antillean knows this all too well, what Fanon
calls ‘the myth of the R-eating man from Martinique’, and will ‘go to
war against it’, ‘suspicious’ especially ‘of his own tongue – a wretchedly
lazy organ’.8 Because he cannot trust his tongue, the Antillean will ‘practice
not only rolling his R but embroidering it’.9 But he will also take care with
such embroidery, lest he falls into the trap of another Antillean, who,
though ‘he had acquired a fine supply of them [Rs] had allocated [them]
badly’, embarrassingly calling out ‘Waiterrr!’ when ‘waiter’ would have suf-
ficed.10 ‘Furtively observing the slightest reactions of others, listening to his
own speech’, he will, in short, betray a ‘desperate determination to learn





























white will be whiter as he gains greater mastery of the cultural tool that [the
French] language is’ (p. 38). This is the key, de Mérida’s, which will unlock
that ‘magic vault of distance’ between the Antillean and the Parisian
(p. 23). ‘The black man who arrives in France changes’, Fanon explains,
‘because to him the country represents the Tabernacle; he changes not
only because it is from France that he received his knowledge of Montes-
quieu, Rousseau and Voltaire, but also because France gave him his phys-
icians, his department heads, his innumerable little functionaries – from
the sergeant-major “fifteen years in the service” to the police-man who
was born in Panissières’ (p. 23). ‘[T]he man who is leaving next week
for France’, in short, ‘creates round himself a magic circle in which the
words Paris, Marseille, Sorbonne, Pigalle become the keys to the vault’
(p. 23; emphasis in original). Within this dizzying kaleidoscopic (en)cul-
turation lies the Antillean’s apotheosis: ‘Yes, I only have one language,
yet it is not mine’.12
‘Division’ Derrida insists, quoting from the Introduction to Abdelk-
ebir Khatibi’s Du bilinguisme (1985) (M, p. 8). ‘Active division’ (p. 8).
‘And that is why’, Derrida writes, ‘there are two motivations instead of
one, a single reason but a reason wrought by said “division”’ (p. 8).
‘[T]hat is why’, Derrida continues, ‘one recollects, one troubles oneself,
one goes in search of history and filiation’ (p. 8). ‘In this place of jealousy’,
Derrida explains, ‘in this place that is divided between vengeance and
resentment [ressentiment], in this body fascinated by its own “division”,
before any other memory’, the body ‘destines itself, as if acting on its
own, to anamnesia’ (p. 8). Yet why ‘anamnesia’?13 Because ‘this monolin-
gualism’, Derrida explains, which ‘I call . . . my dwelling’, and which the
Antillean calls his Paris, which ‘feels like one to me’, which ‘inhabits
me’, this ‘monolingualism’, ‘in which I draw my very breath’, and which
is, ‘for me, my element’, ‘will never be mine’ (pp. 1, 2). ‘[T]his language’,
Derrida laments, ‘the only one I am thus destined to speak, as long as
speech is possible for me in life and in death . . . never will this language
be mine. And, truth to tell, it never was’ (p. 2). Yet there is another
truth, which is that ‘outside of’ this ‘absolute habitat’, ‘I would not be
myself’ (p. 1). ‘It constitutes me’, Derrida insists, ‘prescrib[ing] a monastic
solitude for me; as if, even before learning to speak, I had been bound by
some vows’ (pp. 1–2). Yet however strongly Derrida insists ‘this monolin-
gualism is me’, just as strongly does he put lie to this ‘vow’: ‘it never was’
(p. 1). Within this ‘antimony’, the voyaging Antillean dreams to forget the
division between himself and the Parisian.14
But the Antillean will not forget, for ‘there is [always] a myth to be
faced’, a myth that, to borrow Derrida’s language, ‘summons itself from
memory’.15 The significance of the myth is that the Antillean ‘is
unaware of it as long as his existence is limited to his own environment’




























(B, p. 150). Things change, however, in the Antillean’s first encounter with
the European, where the Antillean feels, as if for the first time, ‘the whole
weight of his blackness’ (p. 150). And what is the outcome of this ‘oppres-
s[ion]’ (p. 150)? The Antillean’s separation from his (French) language.
The myth’s origin lies in the fact that the Antillean ‘does not think of
himself as a black man; he thinks of himself as an Antillean. The Negro
lives in Africa’ (p. 148). For all intents and purposes, Fanon explains,
‘the Antillean conducts himself like a white man’ (p. 148). ‘But’, Fanon
interrupts, he is not, and in fact ‘he is a Negro’ (p. 148). This the Antillean
‘learn[s]’, for instance, ‘once he goes to Europe’, which is that the word
‘Negroes’ ‘includes himself as well as the Senegalese’ (p. 148). Such is
the ‘permanent rub’, laments Fanon, the ‘hidden subtlety’, which the
Antillean discovers, for example, in ‘Charles-André Julien introducing
Aimé Césaire as a “Negro poet with a university degree”, or . . . “a great
black poet”’, but above all, in the glaring disjunction therein: ‘Aimé
Césaire’, ‘a poet’, ‘is really black’ (p. 39). Fanon, recalling French writers
Jean Paulhan and Roger Caiollois, of whom he knew only by their ‘inter-
esting books’, spells out his retort, which is that ‘there is no reason why
André Breton should say of Césaire, “Here is a black man who handles
the French language as no white man today can”’ (p. 39). After all,
Fanon insists, ‘M. Aimé Césaire’ also really is ‘a Martinique and a univer-
sity graduate’ (p. 40). Nevertheless, the ‘paradox’, ‘underline[d]’ through
Breton’s language, remains: in the black man’s hands, the French language
becomes a prop, a masquerade, indeed ‘artifice’: a relic of ‘something
learned’ – the move very subtle – though not ‘properly theirs’.16 In
other words, a mere prosthetic, which, as a prosthetic, is ‘use[d]’ and
‘handl[ed]’, though never ‘authentic[ally]’.17 This artifice doubles as the
logic of the ‘and’ between Césaire and the French language, the former
remarking not a coupling between two but a constitutive divide. Yet, the
Antillean’s ‘genealogical impulse find[s] its moving source, its force and
its recourse in the very partition of this double law, in the antinomical
duplicity of this clause of belonging: we only ever speak one language –
or rather one idiom only; we never speak only one language – or rather
there is no pure idiom’.18
Nor is Fanon unaware of the irony in the Antillean’s usage of that cul-
tural tool of language, whose progressive usage will result in the smashing
away of that cultural difference constitutive of the possibility of picking up
that tool in the first place. On the contrary, this is why the Antillean picks
up that tool, which is to smash away his former existence qua Antillean.
What interests Fanon in pursuing the phenomenology of language is not
what it means ‘[t]o speak a language’, but rather what it means to speak,
hence ‘to take on’, ‘a world, a culture’, of another (p. 38). And again





























substitution’ he imagines transpiring between language and the world,
where to speak a language is to grab hold, as if by the ‘breath’ of one’s
own ‘hands’, the very world itself.19 Still, this observation does not
address why the Antillean places such a premium on a phenomenological
understanding of language, hence why the Antillean ‘adopts such a pos-
ition, peculiar to him, with respect to European languages’ (p. 25).
While it is perhaps true, at least in the Antillean’s view, that he ‘will be pro-
portionally whiter . . . in direct ratio to his mastery of the French language’,
Fanon understates the significance of passing in likening it to a move from
an ‘inferior’ race to ‘the superior race’ (p. 18, 215). On the contrary, what
this becoming whiter means to the Antillean is something more fundamen-
tal. ‘Let me point out once more’, Fanon writes, ‘that the conclusion I have
reached pertain to the French Antilles; at the same time, I am not unaware
that the same behavior pattern obtains in every race that has been subjected
to colonization’ (p. 25). ‘I have known – and unfortunately I still know –
people born in Dahomey or the Congo who pretend to be natives of the
Antilles; I have known, and I still know, Antilles Negroes who are
annoyed when they are suspected of being Senegalese. This is because
the Antilles Negro is more “civilized” than the African, that is, he is
closer to the white man’ (p. 26). And who is the white man? A ‘human
being’, Fanon replies (p. 18). Fanon could not be clearer: the Antillean
desires to come closer to the white man, so that he may ‘come closer to
being a real human being’ (p. 18). The Antillean is not (yet) human.
The weight of the Antillean’s tool could not be heavier, nor more
necessary.
Indeed, it is through the Antillean’s unsteady handling of this tool
that Fanon discloses, via the vignette of an Antillean’s boat-ride to and
from Paris, just how deep those waters can be, which lead one closer to
becoming a real human being. ‘He leaves for the pier’, Fanon tells us of
the seafaring Antillean, ‘and the amputation of his being diminishes as
the silhouette of this ship grows clearer. [For] [i]n the eyes of those who
have come to see him off he can read the evidence of his own maturation,
his power. “Good-by bandanna, good-by straw hat . . . ”’ (p. 23). Yet pro-
blems confront the Antillean upon his return ‘home from France’, where ‘if
he wants to make it plain that nothing has changed’, he ‘expresses himself
in dialect’ (p. 37). Fanon’s setting of the scene is complex, but critical is the
equivocal reception Fanon imagines for the returning Antillean, all of
which hinges on what ‘the voyager tells his acquaintances’ (p. 37). In the
obvious sense of ‘waiting’, Fanon tells us, ‘his family and friends are
waiting for him’ ‘at the dock’ (p. 37). In another sense, however, they
are ‘[w]aiting for him’ not only because his physically arriving, but in
order to ‘strike back [at the European]’ (p. 37). Needless to say, the
waiting will take only ‘a minute or two’ (p. 37). ‘If’, Fanon writes, ‘the




























voyager tells his acquaintances, “I am so happy to be back with you. Good
lord, it is hot in this country, I shall certainly not be able to endure it very
long”, they [will] know’ (p. 37). And what they will know is that ‘[a] Euro-
pean has got off the ship’ (p. 37).
That the Antillean’s failed attempt at passing can be boiled down to
his mismanaging of a dialect is revealing. Yet, this criticism misses the
point, for the Antillean’s failed passing is attributable not to an essentialism
at the root of the European, but rather to what Fanon, quoting, ‘Professor
D. Westermann, in The African Today’, describes as a ‘frequent naiv[ete]’
on the Antillean’s behalf: ‘The wearing of European clothes, whether rags
or the most up-to-date style; using European furniture and European
forms of social intercourse; adorning the Native language with
European expressions, using bombastic phrases in speaking or writing a
European language’ (p. 25). Where for Fanon the Antillean is naı̈ve in
his belief, returning to Westermann, that ‘all these contribute to a
feeling of equality with the European and his achievements’ (p. 25). On
the contrary, just the opposite is true. What the Antillean finds, for
instance, in adorning the native language with European expressions,
using bombastic phrases in speaking or writing a European language, is
less that he is European than that he is both more and less European
than the European. The Antillean’s failed passing lies not in his appropria-
tion of the European language, but rather in the adorning and bombastic
way in which he speaks and writes that language, which, through those
embroidered gestures, belong less to the European and still less to the
Antillean. Though the Antillean’s feeling of equality with the European
and his achievements are sincere, they are feelings invariably embodied
by an abstract European. Because exemplary of an abstract European,
the Antillean, in his manner, identifies with no European.
The Antillean’s crisis parallels Marcel Griaule’s Conversations with
Ogotemmêli.20 David E. Johnson writes: ‘Ogotemmêli – or rather his
“thick lips” – “spoke the purest Sanga language”’ (A, p. 103; trans. John-
son’s). ‘Ogotemmêli’, in other words, ‘is an exemplary Dogon, and as such
he is both the most and least typical Dogon’ (p. 103). ‘[I]n as much as he
speaks the best and purest Sanga’, Johnson explains, ‘a language Griaule
[European ethnographer] could not understand, he best exemplifies the
Dogon’ (p. 103). On the other hand, insofar as Ogotemmêli is ‘the
most exemplary Dogon, he is at the same time the worst example of the
Dogon’, and this on the basis of that incommunicable insularity
(p. 103). Ogotemmêli and the Antillean differ in the former’s being a
problem of understanding and the latter’s one of recognition. Yet, the
anthropological conclusion is the same: language, hence understanding,
takes place on the basis of its being able to communicate, at some





























requires communicability with the other. Not in order that the other may
belong to the group, but rather that the group may identify it as its other –
as, precisely, not belonging to the group.21 This identification stymied, as
with Ogotemmêli and the Antillean, the implication is clear: they are not
even other. Fanon’s conclusion, an interpolation of Mannoni’s Malagasy
‘dilemma, turn white or disappear’, is not surprising, if not too late, for
the Antillean, if not Ogotemmêli, has already disappeared.22 And yet,
despite the other’s excoriation, neither has disappeared. Indeed, it is
their refusal to assimilate, which is to say, their insistence to define them-
selves, to in fact define the other, outside the proprietary categories of alter-
ity provided by the other, that is so threatening to the other, and this on the
basis of its revealing the artificiality at the base of the European’s under-
standing of difference. The European acknowledges the difference of the
Antillean, just not this difference, which reveals, in the form of passing
for the European, the constitutive codification of that European identity.
Thus does the other intervene again, this time more stridently: ‘throw
off [your] “Parisianism” or die of ridicule’ (B, p, 25). Finally, the Antillean
has no choice. Outside of ‘[t]hese two solutions . . . there is no salvation’
(p. 93). Just as the Antillean is robbed of the ‘time to “make it [drama]
unconscious”’, the racial drama, Fanon explains, ‘played out in the
open’, so does the Antillean again encounter time, though this time in
the form of a temporality with which ‘there is . . . no forgetting: when he
marries, his wife will be aware that she is marrying a joke, and his children
will have a legend to face and to live down’ (pp. 150, 25).
Fanon’s likening the Antillean’s passing, in all its saturnalian foibles,
to the putting on of a costume, is telling, and is the reason why the Antil-
lean’s friends and family strike back at him; for the Antillean traveller is no
longer one of them but is rather the European other; and not even authen-
tically, but rather via a Parisian costume, thrown on by himself. Neither
Antillean, nor Parisian, nor even human, the passing Antillean, finally,
does not even exist.23 Nevertheless, the Antillean’s recriminations would
not be so severe were he not ignorant of the fact that, in dropping
his own culture, he is adopting less another culture than another mythol-
ogy 24: not ‘Sho’ good eatin’, but the ‘self-aggrandiz[ing]’ and laughingly
bifurcating ‘I am so happy to be back with you’ (pp. 112, 37). The Antil-
lean inevitably finds himself in the same fictive position as before. Yet
whereas the previous mythology is born out of a genealogy of enslavement,
his present one is born out of a genealogy of luxuriance. However, both are
false. Whether he is ‘answer[-ing] only in French, and often . . . no longer
understanding Creole’, or ever-so ‘slight[ly] depart[ing]’ from the French,
the Antillean is always ‘reveal[ing]’ this slight departure between himself
and the culture for which he is passing, and, hence, ‘reveal[ing] himself
at once’.25 The Parisian costume is ‘not opaque’ at all, but all too




























‘transparent’ (p. 112). Yet this is what, according to Fanon, they know and
he does not know (those observing the passing), which is that ‘with [us] this
game cannot be played’ (p. 36). What for one Antillean is passing is for
another simply ‘put[ting] on the white world’ (p. 36).
In figuring his drive to become a real human being only through the
horizon of the European, the Antillean had forgotten his Rousseau: ‘The
language called maternal’, Derrida writes, ‘is never purely natural, nor
proper, nor inhabitable’ (M, p. 58). ‘[O]ne never inhabits’, Derrida
explains, ‘what one is in the habit of calling inhabiting’, as in the case of
his ‘foreign’ ‘mother tongue’.26 Derrida’s reading picks up on the ‘equiv-
ocal’ meaning of habitation, the idea that ‘habitat’ is ‘possible’ only with
the concomitant ‘difference’ of its ‘exile’, this difference in turn creating
‘nostalgia’ for that ‘exile[d]’ maternal language (p. 58). This coupling of
exclusion and nostalgia is for Derrida the ‘a priori universal’ ‘twist to
this truth’ of habitation, which is the idea of an ‘originary’, ‘essential alien-
ation’ at the heart of ‘language’ (pp. 58, 63, 58). Such alienation remarks
the extent to which ‘every language’ is ‘a language of the other’ (p. 63). Yet
while such ‘ambiguity’ is ‘[u]nsettling’, we misread Derrida if we attribute
our uneasiness to the fact that ‘this ambiguity will never be removed’
(p. 62). On the contrary, Derrida explains, our discomfort lies in the
fact that this ambiguity in habitation is, in fact, ‘constitutive’ (p. 25).
‘This structure of alienation without alienation’, Derrida writes, ‘this
inalienable alienation, is not only the origin of our responsibility, it also
structures the peculiarity . . . and property of language’, which is, as
Derrida explains several pages later, ‘the impossible property of a language’
(pp. 25, 63). ‘[T]he prior-to-the-first language’, for example, ‘can always
run the risk of becoming or wanting to be another language of the
master’, or even ‘sometimes’, as evidenced by the Antillean, ‘that of new
masters’ (p. 62). The point being, as Derrida writes a few pages back,
that language’s essential alienation is, in fact, an alienation constitutive
of ‘all culture’ (p. 58). The French language is no more the Parisian’s
than it is the Antillean’s. Returning to the Antillean, the shape that
would emerge, after the Antillean had smashed away his previous identity,
could only ever be a ‘replica’, and an ‘[in]complete’ one at that, ‘of the
white man’ – and this because his, the European’s, is simply a replica of
a replica (B, p. 36). ‘How’, Derrida asks, ‘does one account for this
logic’? (M, p. 67). Again we return to this constitutive alienation.
‘Although’, Derrida writes, ‘I have often made use of the expression “the
given language” in order to speak of an available monolanguage – for
example, French – there is no given language’ (p. 67). ‘[O]r rather’,
Derrida continues, ‘there is some language, a gift of language, but there
is not a language. Not a given one. It does not exist’ (p. 67). Derrida





























expectation of hospitality turns out rather to be the obligation of ours
(p. 67). Language, in this instance the French language, is ‘given’, may
even be called one’s mother tongue, ‘only’ to the extent that it is given
as this language of another (p. 67).
Passing takes place at the level of language, though begins at the level
of perception. This is borne out in Fanon’s own understanding of passing,
itself indebted to Lacan’s mirror stage lecture, originally delivered by Lacan
in 1949.27 Fanon’s thesis is that ‘[t]he colonized is elevated above his jungle
status in proportion to his adoption of the mother country’s cultural stan-
dards’ (B, p. 18). Fanon’s argument, in other words, proceeds by analogy.
In much the same way as Lacan’s ‘infant in front of the mirror’ finds
himself ‘caught up in the lure of spatial identification’, ‘overcom[ing], in
a jubilant activity, the obstructions of his support and, fixing his attitude
in a slightly leaning-forward position, in order to fix its gaze, bring[ing]
back an instantaneous aspect of the image’, so does the Antillean, before
the ‘culture of the mother country’, undergo his own ‘orthopaedic’
‘elevat[ion]’, ‘becom[ing] whiter as he renounces his blackness, his
jungle’, the ‘obstructions of his support’.28 Fanon and Lacan part ways
in Fanon’s recognizing that the colonized finds himself ‘face to face’ as
much with the other as ‘with the language of the civilizing nation’ (p. 18).
Not that Fanon, at least until a certain ‘white winter day’, had more
than ‘an intellectual understanding of these differences’ (p. 113, 110).
Fanon had certainly conversed with friends and colleagues over these trou-
bling differences, finding in these discussions the conviction to ‘assert the
equality of all men in the world’ (p. 110). Yet if Fanon was ‘satisfied’, at
least on a psychoanalytic level, with Lacan’s thesis that the ego ‘prefigures
its alienating destination’, that ‘consciousness of the body’, as Fanon
observes, ‘is solely a negating activity’, that intellectual understanding
would reveal its limitations when ‘the occasion arose’, our recalling
Fanon’s above conceit, ‘to meet the white man’s eyes’.29 Fanon understood
the ‘asymptotic’ way ego and I ‘rejoin’ one another (E, p. 2). But such
asymptoticity, Fanon would insist, could not account for the ‘difficulties’
‘the man of color encounters’ ‘in the development of his bodily schema
. . . [i]n the white world’ (B, p. 110). While Lacan’s logic of asymptoticity
was sound, what Lacan could not know, and this because Fanon did not
know, is the ‘moment’ the Antillean’s ‘inferiority comes into being’
(p. 110). Yet it is this moment Fanon would ‘discover’ in the discovery,
as if for the first time, of his own ‘blackness’ (p. 112). Fanon found how
the Antillean’s inferiority comes into being: ‘through the other’ (p. 110).
30In Fanon’s encounter with the European, he finds his body
‘sprawled out, distorted’, ‘given back to [him]’, his message of compassion,
earlier given to the Algerian Muslims, ‘flung back in [his] face’ (pp. 113,
114).31 ‘I wanted to come lithe and young into a world that was ours’,




























Fanon recalls himself writing, ‘and to help build it together’ (pp. 112–
113). But this recognition would remain troubled in his later encounter
with the European, and this because of an avowed tendency, on both
sides, to ‘apprehend the existence of the other’ not as a ‘natural reality’
but as an instance of ‘thematization’ (pp. 217, 112). Fanon is only too
well aware of the consequences of ‘clos[ing] the circuit’ of ‘reciprocity’
(p. 217). By ‘prevent[ing] the accomplishment of movement in two direc-
tions’, Fanon had learned from Hegel, hence by denying the other’s ability
to go ‘beyond [his] own immediate being’, ‘I keep the other within himself’
(p. 217). Indeed, Fanon continues, ‘[u]ltimately I deprive him . . . of this
being-for-itself’ (p. 217). The ‘stakes are high’, and Fanon would soon dis-
cover just how high.32
‘Look, a Negro!’ (p. 111). Fanon will again hear these words from the
child. The words are a source of forced identification; Fanon is forced to
acknowledge, both to himself and the other, his ‘corporeal’ difference
from the European (p. 112). This sense of public shaming is what resonates
in the passage, a spectacle before which Fanon can only confess: ‘it was
true’ (p. 111). Fanon appropriately directs the comment not to the
child, but to the legitimating witness to this spectacle: the child’s
mother. Though the child breaks Fanon’s ‘anonymity’ and ‘invisibility’,
‘notices’ him and draws him out of the ‘corners’ and into the ‘world’,
the mother reveals to those ‘white faces’ the emergence of this ‘new . . .
man’ (p. 116). Yet not simply a new man, but a ‘new kind of man, a
new genus’ (p. 116). What appears before mother and child is not
Fanon ‘the black physician’, but ‘always the Negro teacher, the Negro
doctor’ (p. 117). But nor is the birth painless. ‘[L]aid bare’ before the
‘white eyes’ of mother and child, the ‘only real eyes’, Fanon can only
clutch at his own eyes as the European ‘dissect[s]’ and ‘cut[s] away slices
of [his] reality’ (p. 116). Stripped of his ‘refined manners, . . . knowledge
of literature, or understanding of the quantum theory’, only truth speaks
here: ‘Mama, a Negro!’ (pp. 117, 113). Fanon, though, would seem to
have little room to manoeuvre, ‘the evidence’ already ‘there, unalterable’
(p. 117).
Fanon cannot cover what is already there, what ‘pursue[s]’ and ‘dis-
turb[s]’ him, for this ‘dark and unarguable’ truth is his own ‘blackness’
(p. 117). It is why, for instance, Fanon finds an affinity in de Mérida,
who similarly speaks of being ‘fixed’, ‘overdetermined from without’
(p. 116; emphasis removed). Like de Mérida, Fanon is also ‘given no
chance’, though not because he is ‘the slave . . . of the “idea” that others
have of [him]’, but because he is a slave ‘of [his] own appearance’
(p. 116). Fanon’s imagery of imprisonment is notably ironic, since at its
core, at least as Fanon is ‘told’, ‘there is no wish, no intention to anger





























the way they are’ (p. 33). But this ‘paternal’ (p. 33) fixity cuts both ways,
and is why, as Fanon reveals in the vignette of ‘[t]he physicians of the
public health care services’, there is a difference in the reception of
‘[t]wenty European patients, one after another’, and the sudden appearance
of ‘a Negro or an Arab’ (p. 32). It is not the somatic difference that interests
Fanon, but the linguistic one that follows therefrom. Whereas, for
example, the physician capaciously tells the European patient, ‘Please sit
down . . . Why do you wish to consult me? . . . What are your symptoms?
. . . ’, he cuts the Antillean to the quick: ‘Sit there, boy . . . What’s bothering
you? . . . Where does it hurt, huh? . . . ’ (p. 32). Both ‘manner[s] of classify-
ing’ are ‘automatic’, European and Antillean (p. 32). But the Antillean’s
stands out. What takes place between Antillean and physician is indeed
understanding, but understanding in the service of ‘primitivizing’ and ‘dec-
ivilizing’ the Antillean, who is expected to sit passively before: ‘G’morning,
pal. Where’s it hurt? Huh? Lemme see – belly ache? Heart pain?’ (pp. 32,
33). No answer will be forthcoming, nor will the physician wait for one, for
the physician already understands: that’s just the way they are. But behind
‘this lack of interest, this indifference’, is a very particular imperative,
which, even if not explicitly ‘express[ed]’, is felt all the same: ‘You’d
better keep your place’ (pp. 32, 34). Though Fanon ‘knew that these state-
ments were false’, that he was not ‘savage, brut[ish], illiterate’, in the main
there was only truth: ‘Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened!’
(pp. 117, 112).
‘Frightened!’ Fanon exclaims, less out of incredulity than exasper-
ation; for this was now also true: not that the child was afraid, but that
the mother was ‘[n]ow . . . beginning to be afraid of [him]’ (p. 112). But
now a third voice slowly enters the picture, ‘Hell, he’s getting mad . . . ’,
only to be joined by a fourth, as we find ourselves ‘in a bar, in Rouen or
Strasbourg’ (pp. 113, 33). The location is not important. ‘You –
Africa?’ an interlocutor breaks in, as if with a question (p. 33). But this
is not a question; this is an index into Fanon’s composition: ‘Dakar, Rufis-
que, whorehouse, dames, café, mangoes, bananas . . . ’ (p. 33). As the
drunk continues to rattle off names, Fanon quickly departs, though not
without a ‘torrent of abuse’ (p. 33). Still, the location does not matter.
Whatever the European’s reply, whether the punitive, ‘You didn’t play
big shot like that in your jungle, you dirty nigger!’ or the cool, ‘Take no
notice, sir, he does not know that you are as civilized as we . . . ’, his
retort to his companion will always be the same: ‘You see? I wasn’t
kidding you. That’s just the way they are’.33
Though Fanon has ‘the same morphology, the same histology’ as the
European, the tell-tale signs of his being ‘a human being’ will ‘very soon
disappear’ as he discovers that the only thing he shares with the European
is that ‘he has his heart on the left side’.34 In one respect, Fanon is simply




























‘the neighbor across the street’, a ‘cousin’ on some ‘mother’s side’ (p. 118).
But from another view, he is nothing of the kind, a difference drawn out as
easily as a change in the weather. Fanon returns us to the scene between
himself and the boy. Both are ‘shivering’, for it is ‘cold’ outside
(p. 114). But when Fanon turns to the boy he finds he is not ‘shivering
with [that] cold that goes through you’, but with the fear of being
‘afraid’ (p. 114). For when the boy himself turns to Fanon he sees not a
shivering figure but a figure ‘quivering with rage’ (p. 114). The ‘handsome
little boy’, Fanon’s contrast intentional, subsequently ‘throws himself into
his mother’s arms’ (p. 114). Fanon is the boy’s neighbour, he is his cousin.
But at the moment he is that terrible ‘archetype’ come to life, whose ‘great
big hands’ and ‘incisors’ ‘eat . . . up’ ‘magnificent blond child[ren]’.35
Fanon will indeed not ‘go unnoticed’ but be ‘catalogu[ed] and
prob[ed]’, the easier to be ‘classified’, ‘tucked away’, ‘hid[den]’ from
sight.36 The easier, in other words, to return him to the innocuous anon-
ymity of the neighbour across the street. But Fanon is ‘a good tactician’; he
will not be taken by surprise (p. 118). Still, he will fail to understand: ‘[t]he
white world, the only honorable one, barred me from all participation’
(p. 114).
Though Fanon ‘demand[s]’ ‘an explanation’, there will be none, save
the movement of this figure as he ‘stumble[s]’ ‘out of the world’ (p. 109).
Yet Fanon will not be denied as he ‘reach[es to] the other side’ to try to
‘restore’ himself to that world (p. 109). He will be successful, though
not in the way he intended. In reaching back to the European’s world,
the only real world, Fanon will find ‘his Negro essence, his Negro
“nature”’ (p. 186). But this essence, of course, belongs not to him but to
the other, whose ‘science’, for instance, tells Fanon he is ‘the foundation
of cannibalism’ (p. 120). Nor is this an ‘intact’ essence, as Fanon discovers
he is as much always a cannibal as ‘always a servant, always obsequious and
smiling, me never steal, me never lie, eternally “sho good eatin” . . . ’
(p. 186). Fanon can only stare, transfixed, as the ‘movements, the attitudes,
the glances of the others fix [him] there’, like an image ‘on the screen’
(pp. 109, 186). For this is an image on the screen. Fanon ‘is a human
being’, but a human being who ‘ha[s] no culture, no civilization, no
“long historical past”’, at least not outside ‘the history that the others
have compiled for [him]’ (pp. 120, 34, 120). Nothing seemed real, and
though ‘the circle was drawing a bit tighter’, Fanon’s only urge was to
‘laugh [him]self to tears’ (p. 112).37
‘Everything that makes us laugh’, according to Mikhail Bakhtin, ‘is
close at hand’, by which he means ‘all comical creativity works in a zone
of maximal proximity’.38 In order for an object ‘to be made comical’,
Bakhtin writes, ‘it must be brought close’ (D, p. 23). Bakhtin’s example





























‘cannot be comical’ (p. 23). Laughter, for Bakhtin, is thus a kind of ethno-
graphic heuristic. In laughing, we ‘make’ the distant and strange into ‘an
object of familiar contact’, thus bring the object close to ourselves
(p. 23). Bakhtin is even more pointed a few sentences later, describing
‘[l]aughter’ as ‘a vital factor in laying down that prerequisite for fearlessness
without which it would be impossible to approach the world realistically’
(p. 23). But though laughter works toward familiarity, we misread Bakhtin
if we understand familiarity as a means to an end rather than a pawn within
a larger contest between two heteroglossic planes: a ‘distanced plane’ and a
‘plane of laugher’ (p. 23). Laughter’s goal, Bakhtin explains, is the ‘removal
of an object from the distanced plane’ onto that plane of laughter (p. 23).
Familiarity is not to be sustained, for laughter’s purpose is not understand-
ing. Its purpose, rather, is ‘abuse’, indeed, ‘ridicule’ (p. 23).
Laughter brings about this abuse through the same mechanism by
which it does the familiar: the ‘destr[uction]’ of ‘any hierarchical (distan-
cing and valorized) distance’ between self and other (p. 23). The difference
is Bakhtin’s revealing the true aim of that propinquity. What materializes
in laughter’s zone of maximal proximity is what Bakhtin describes as laugh-
ter’s ‘zone of maximal familia[rity]’, a zone recalling what David
E. Johnson, in critique of Johannes Fabian’s Time and the Other, describes
as ‘[t]he absolute reduction of time and space in order to institute the co of
coevalness and collaboration’ between ‘ethnographer and informant’39
Unlike our earlier understanding of laughter, in this zone of ‘crude
contact’, the familiar, recalling what Johnson describes as ‘the horizon of
immediacy and simultaneity’, is turned against itself, merely the means
by which laughter may ‘demolish fear and pity before an object, before a
world, making it an object of familiar contact’.40 By ‘assault[ing]’ and
‘destr[oying]’ the ‘distanced plane’, laughter achieves Fabian’s ‘coevalness’,
which Fabian defines as ‘sharing of present Time’, and this toward the
‘exclu[sion]’ of ‘any spatial or temporal gap between ethnographer and
informant’.41 This is notable. Without this gap, equally ‘foreclose[d]’ is
‘the possibility of the arrival of the other as other’.42 There is, literally,
no time for the other, who is immediately seized. Still, this is merely pre-
paratory toward laughter’s higher goal: ‘clearing the ground for an absol-
utely free investigation of it [object]’ (D, p. 23). ‘As it draws an object
to itself and makes it familiar’, Bakhtin writes, laughter ‘delivers the
object into the fearless hands of investigative experiment – both scientific
and artistic – and into the hands of free experimental fantasy’ (p. 23). Just
as the object falls from the hands of the familiar into those of the fantastic,
so it is delivered from the plane of distance and onto the plane of laughter.
Not that this is a reprieve, at least not in any meaningful sense of the term,
the object immediately seeing, upon its descent, a whole panoply of
macabre possibilities opening up before it, possibilities which, like the




























now-‘dismember[ed]’ and ‘dead object’, are all too-readily ‘la[in] bare’
(p. 24).
But we are not surprised, for what takes place on this plane ‘is a
comical operation of dismemberment’, the object ‘broken apart, laid
bare’ (p. 24). What suddenly ‘assumes special importance’, for instance,
is ‘the back and rear portion of an object’, which, like ‘its innards’,
which are also ‘not normally accessible for viewing’, are now visible
‘whole objects’ around which ‘one can . . . walk’ (p. 23). Bakhtin calls
this ‘ridiculous’, which is ‘the naked object’, ‘stripped and separated
from its . . . “empty clothing”’, now also ‘separated from its person’
(p. 24). ‘What remains supreme here’, in short, on the plane of laughter,
is this ‘artistic logic of analysis, dismemberment’, which turns on
‘turning things into dead objects’ (p. 24). ‘One ridicules’, according to
Bakhtin, ‘in order to forget’ (p. 23).
After being ‘assailed at various points’ by the other, Fanon realizes
why, though tempted, he did not laugh: not because to do so would be
to laugh with those already laughing at him, but because the European,
accordingly, was never laughing at him, Frantz Fanon, to begin with:
the object of the European’s fear was indeed only an object: not the
body of Frantz Fanon but the ‘legends, stories, history, and above all his-
toricity’, out of which that body is constituted (p. 112; emphasis in orig-
inal). The European’s fear lay within a schema that, while figured
through the ‘corporeal’, has its basis in the deeper yet more ‘opaque’,
‘racial’ and ‘historic[al]’ (p. 112). Yet nor was Fanon’s discovery easy: ‘I
thought that what I had in hand was to construct a physiological self, to
balance space, to localize sensations’ (p. 111). But Fanon could not ‘loca-
lize’ the ‘external stimulus that flicked over [him]’ as he ‘passed by’ the
European ‘[o]n that day’ (pp. 111, 112). For what Fanon had ‘take[n]
hold of’, in his ‘trembling hands’, indeed, what was too big for his
hands, was a psychical rather than a phenomenological problem
(p. 121). This is why, when Fanon grabs hold of himself he takes hold
of ‘nothing’: not because the ‘vein has been mined out’, but because
there was never a vein to begin with (p. 121). Finding himself rehearsing
a modern-day Frankenstein’s Monster come to life, the ‘elements’ out of
which Fanon discovers he is constituted, as he retraces his ‘move[s]
toward the other’, lie not within the ‘residual sensations and perceptions
. . . of a tactile, vestibular, kinesthetic, and visual character’, but within
‘the other, the white man, who ha[s] woven [him] out of a thousand
details, anecdotes, [and] stories’ (pp. 111, 112, 111). Wilting under the
perdurance of its historicity, the black body, less in Fanon’s hands






























In the shift from a corporeal to a ‘racial epidermal’ understanding of
his body, Fanon moves from a spatial to a temporal awareness of his body
(p. 112). This means not the eschewal of the corporeal but its mediation
through the temporal. Fanon discovers what T.S. Eliot calls his ‘historical
sense’, which Eliot describes as ‘perception’ ‘not only of the pastness of the
past but of its presence’.43 Eliot’s historical sense distinguishes itself from a
synchronic understanding of time in collecting within itself ‘a sense of [the]
timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timelessness and of the tem-
poral together’ (ADE, p. 44). Fanon evokes Eliot’s historical synergy in
finding himself, in his encounter with the other, moving in ‘spa[tial]
terms’, ‘existing’, as says, ‘triply’ (B, p. 112). ‘I was responsible at the
same time’, Fanon writes, ‘for my body, for my race, for my ancestors’
(p. 112). In the shift to an epidermal awareness, Fanon acquires what
Eliot, in the vernacular of poetry, calls a ‘write[r’s] comp[ulsion]’ (ADE,
p. 44). Yet whether defined as responsibility, as Fanon does, or as compul-
sion, as Eliot does, the diachronic composition of the colonial encounter
unfolds just the same: the writer, encountering the other, suddenly over-
whelmed with a ‘comp[ulsion] . . . to write not merely with his own gener-
ation in his bones, but with a feeling that the whole of the literature of
Europe from Homer and within it the whole of the literature of his own
country had a simultaneous existence and compose[d] a simultaneous
order’ within him (ADE, p. 44). His body stitched together as much by
European as Francophone hands, the hybrid pens of which had already
staged his encounter with the other, Fanon bears witness to this temporal
cathexis in the only way he can: the ‘batter[ing] down’ as much ‘by tom-
toms’ as ‘cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetichism, racial defects
[and] slaveships’ (B, 112). We understand Fanon’s account when we recog-
nize, along with Lokangaka Losambe, that Fanon’s ‘uncanny journey into
[his] own interiority’, insofar as a journey precipitated by what Diana Fuss
calls an ‘imaginary relation of fractured specularity’, is a journey that moves
along less synchronically than diachronically.44 Fanon’s interiority, as
Eliot’s historical sense makes clear, while figured through the body of
Fanon, ultimately refers not to the body but to its race and ancestors;
Eliot’s logic turns on the understanding that Fanon’s body is as much a
body as a temporal ‘menagerie’, which, when pulled apart, reveals the
linings less of history than of historicity.45
His message, now his body, properly returned to him, Fanon’s atten-
tion is not on the ‘burden of that corporeal malediction’ but the ‘rhythmic
attitude’ opened in him by the other, whose ‘sensitiv[e]’ strings, reaching as
far down as Langston Hughes’ ‘deep rivers’ as the ‘soul[s]’‘grown deep’
therein, will ‘set [Fanon] on his feet again’ (pp. 111, 127).46,47 Fanon’s
encounter with the other is generative, giving him the courage to reach
within himself, grab hold of the compassionate roots he had planted in




























Algeria, ‘[t]o understand and to love’, and to shake out the memories of
their meaning (p. 7). ‘Superiority? Inferiority? Why not the quite simple
attempt to touch the other, to feel the other, to explain myself to the
other?’ (p. 231). Fanon’s ‘welcoming of the other’, to borrow Theodore
W. Jennings, Jr’s language, whether ‘the stranger, the foreigner’, differen-
tiates itself from Hegelian appropriations in that it does not ‘wish to reduce
the other to an extension or echo of oneself’.48 What drives this openness is
not a desire ‘to integrate or assimilate them (in that case to Europeanize
them), but [to] respect, indeed in a way [to] celebrate, their otherness or
alterity’ (R, p. 112). And yet, as Fanon discovers while reading Sartre,
the former recalling Hegel, the inability ‘to see them as myself’ is often
also the basis of Europeanization.49
Describing Hegel’s dialectic within the colonial world, Sartre had
found that ‘negritude’, ‘[i]n fact’, ‘appears as the minor term of a dialectical
progression’ (qtd. in B, p. 133). ‘The theoretical and practical assertion of
the supremacy of the white man’, Sartre had written, ‘is its thesis; the pos-
ition of negritude as an antithetical value is the moment of negativity’
(ibid.). Having explained this, however, Sartre could not help but
observe that ‘this negative moment is insufficient by itself’ (ibid.).
Sartre’s conclusion was all too clear. Indeed, as if to rub salt in the
wound, this is what Fanon, Sartre implies, ‘knew very well; they know
that it [their negritude] is intended to prepare the synthesis or realization
of the human in a society without races’ (ibid.). Fanon, finding himself
‘robbed of [his] last chance’, could not have been more disappointed
(ibid.). ‘Help had been sought from a friend of colored peoples’, Fanon
writes, ‘and that friend had found no better response than to point out
the relativity of what they were doing’ (ibid.).
Before Black Orpheus, Fanon understood ‘black consciousness’ in
terms entirely opposite those of Sartre’s: ‘immanent in its own eyes’,
without appeal to ‘potentiality’ or ‘universal[ity]’ (p. 135). ‘No prob-
ability’, Fanon insisted, ‘has any place inside me’ (p. 135). After Sartre,
everything changed. Whereas Fanon had claimed ‘My Negro consciousness
does not hold itself out as lack. It is. It is its own follower’, Fanon now
found himself forced to accommodate an opposite view: that it is ‘not I
who make a meaning for myself, but it is the meaning that was already
there, pre-existing, waiting for me’ (pp. 135, 134; emphasis in original).
The black consciousness Fanon embraced as his own, he now found
‘held out’ in front of him ‘as an absolute density’ (p. 134). Sartre had mis-
understood. While an individual might ‘proclaim the oneness of the suffer-
ing’, as in Jacques Roumain’s ‘Bois-d’ébène’, this did not mean that ‘Negro
experience is . . . a whole’, or that ‘there is . . . merely one Negro’.50 On the
contrary, Fanon insisted, the totality of that ‘suffering’, found in ‘Bois-





























in original). Yet while Fanon was proclaiming the ‘mortar of the age of
brotherhood’ is ‘mix[ed] . . . /out of the dust of idols’, Sartre had already
replied: black consciousness is merely a ‘transition’, ‘a means and not an
ultimate end’.51 Fanon and Sartre were speaking at cross-purposes.
Though Fanon would claim Sartre misread Hegel, having ‘forgotten that
consciousness has to lose itself in the night of the absolute, the only con-
dition to attain to consciousness of self’, the damage was done: ‘Jean-
Paul Sartre, in this work, ha[d] destroyed black zeal’.52
Fanon’s response to Sartre parallels Simone de Beauvoir’s several years
later in Que peut la littérature? (1965) in her critique of ‘the absolute reality’
of ‘the literary work’.53 Just as Fanon finds in Sartre a passivity merely ful-
filling history’s role for itself, so does de Beauvoir find, in claims to know
the absolute reality of the literary work, ‘an alienated creature, whose only
task is to realize the pre-existing order of the text’ (WC, p. 190). De Beau-
voir’s passivity is Fanon’s, from the position of the literary critic: one recog-
nizes oneself not as ‘the author [who] writes the score (partition)’, but ‘the
reader [who] provides the concert performance’ (p. 191).
Fanon’s own example is Sartre’s Black Orpheus. ‘Today’, Fanon
writes, reading from Sartre’s text, ‘let us hail the turn of history that will
make it possible for the black man to utter [quoting Césaire] “the great
Negro cry with a force that will shake the foundations of the world”’ (B,
p. 134). While Sartre had found in Césaire that enviable turn of history
by which the black man would utter the great Negro cry, Fanon,
turning his eyes to that turn, found a different view. Such a turn belonged
not to Césaire, not to the Negro cry, but to history. ‘[I]t is not out of my
bad nigger’s misery, my bad nigger’s teeth, my bad nigger’s hunger that I
will shape a torch with which to burn down the world’, Fanon found
himself reading, ‘but it is the torch that was already there, waiting for
that turn of history’ (p. 134). The Negro cry, Fanon came to understand,
revealing Sartre’s bastardization of Césaire, would not shake the foun-
dations of the world, for it was merely the minor term of a dialectical pro-
gression. In the attempt to ‘grasp [his] own being’, Fanon found his
‘name’, but at the expense of his being (p. 137).54 While Fanon was
telling Sartre, ‘My negritude is neither a tower nor a cathedral/it thrusts
into the red flesh of the sun/it thrusts into the burning flesh of the sky/it
hollows through the dense dismay of its own pillar of patience . . . ’,
Sartre was developing his ‘commonplace’ bildungsroman narrative:
‘You’ll change, my boy; I was like that too when I was young; . . . you’ll
see, it will all pass’.55
What interests us in de Beauvoir and Fanon is their theorization of
loss. Fanon, ‘need[ing] to lose [himself] completely in negritude’,
‘need[ing]’, as he explains, ‘not to know’, finds, instead, Sartre’s dialectic
(p. 135; emphasis in original). The outcome is as expected. While ‘[i]n




























opposition to historical becoming, there had always been the unforesee-
able’, [t]his struggle’ had now ‘tak[en] on an aspect of completeness’
(p. 135). By ‘bring[ing] necessity into the foundation of . . . freedom’, as
Sartre had done, Fanon could only find in Sartre the opposite of what
he was looking for: being ‘driv[en] out of himself’ (p. 135). Fanon was
only getting in his own way.
If Fanon’s language is betrayed by a muscularity at its roots, it is a
muscularity attributable to the heavy ‘task’ Fanon set before himself: a
‘complete lysis’ as much of these aberrations as the ‘morbid body’ to
which they belong (pp. 222, 10). This is what Fanon, in contradistinction
to Sartre, though in agreement with Nietzsche, finds to be ‘the prime task
of him who, having taken thought, prepares to act’, which is ‘[t]o educate
man to be actional’, for ‘[m]an’, as Fanon continues, ‘is not only reactional’
(p. 222; emphasis in original).56 Against the backdrop of Emerson’s call to
self-reliance, a strain of thought picked up by Nietzsche, Fanon would
‘define [himself] as an absolute intensity of beginning’ (p. 138). It is
with this absolute intensity that Fanon would ‘t[ake] up [his] negritude,
and with tears in [his] eyes . . . put its machinery together again’
(p. 138). Fanon’s fashioning of the body, branching out, on the one
hand, toward the somatic, and, on the other, toward the machinic, is
telling, not least because of how it dissolves the schism, reimagining the
hand as the basis of human and machine.
Not that Fanon reserves his hands for the clearing away of tears, so
that machinery may be put together again. If Sartre had ‘shattered
[Fanon’s] last illusion’, ‘broken’ his ‘Negrohood’ ‘to pieces’, Fanon
would simply ‘rebuil[d]’ and ‘reconstruct’ himself, but ‘by the intuitive
lianas of [his] hands’ (pp. 137, 138). If tears need not be cleared away
by the hands, it is because those hands, like roots, are intuitive. Fanon’s
hands would be guided not by sight but by sense and touch. Yet if
hands are Fanon’s conceit, we need to understand them within their
context, which is Fanon’s defining them, in opposition to history, as the
‘the meaning of [his] destiny’ (p. 229). ‘Mankind find[s] a meaning’,
according to Fanon, only by ‘digging in its own flesh’ (p. 9). This is
what Fanon reserves for his hands: ‘endless creat[ion]’ of ‘[him]self’
(p. 229). Though Fanon initially identifies his ‘propos[al]’ as ‘the liberation
of the man of color from himself’, he modifies the phrasing on the next
page, recognizing as his broader aim ‘to set man free’ (pp. 8, 9).57
Fanon would remain true to his emancipatory philosophy, inscribing, on
the same penultimate page of Black Skin, White Masks, his ‘only’ wish as
‘the man of color’: ‘the enslavement of man by man cease forever’
(p. 231). Fanon believed that if this reciprocal goal could be achieved,
‘of one by another’, so could his larger dream: ‘[t]hat it be possible for





























‘Ideally’, Fanon insists, ‘the present will always contribute to the build-
ing of the future’ (p. 13). ‘And this future is not the future of the cosmos but
rather the future of my century, my country, my existence’ (p. 13). Though
Fanon opens Black Skin, White Masks with the insistence that we ‘belong
irreducibly to [our] own time’, as in we are irreducibly ‘connected to the
present’, it is a gesture that much more open in his closing pages (p. 13).
While Fanon says, early on, ‘In no fashion should I undertake to prepare
the world that will come later’ (p. 13), I read these words alongside his
later, closing ‘prayer’ (p. 232), the juxtaposition of which finds me organiz-
ing my reading around the profound sense of responsibility found in that
prayer, that if Fanon ‘connect[s us] to the present’, it is in order to reveal
our responsibility to it qua ‘belong[ing]’ (p. 13). What opens as the
narrow claim, Black Skin, White Masks, that ‘I belong irreducibly to my
time’, becomes the ‘prayer’, Fanon’s, that we recognize our responsibility
thereto, a prayer that we acknowledge the present, but also see it ‘in terms
of something to be exceeded’, what we presumably do, as Fanon closes his
prayer, when we see the ‘future’ ‘always’, as an ‘edifice’ ‘supported’, hence
‘question[ed]’ (or not), ‘by’ the ‘living’ (p. 13).
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